Why ships with “approved plans” still run aground
Contents
Use the links below to jump to any section:
- Why Studying Failures Matters
- The “Plan Was Approved” Trap
- Over-Reliance on ECDIS and Alarms
- No-Go Areas That Existed Only on Paper
- Tight Margins Disguised as Precision
- XTE and the Illusion of Protection
- UKC Misjudgement and Speed Blindness
- Monitoring Collapse During Routine Periods
- Abort Points That Were Never Used
- The Human Patterns Behind Repeated Accidents
- How Professionals Break the Cycle
1. Why Studying Failures Matters
Accidents rarely introduce new lessons.
They repeat old ones — often word for word.
Investigations consistently show that the tools existed, the plans existed, and the information existed. What failed was how the plan was thought about, monitored, and challenged.
Understanding failure patterns is not about blame.
It is about recognising traps before you step into them.
2. The “Plan Was Approved” Trap
One of the most common phrases in investigation reports is:
“A passage plan had been prepared and approved.”
Approval is not execution.
Execution is not monitoring.
Plans are often approved days before sailing and never meaningfully revisited, even as conditions change.
This creates a dangerous psychological anchor:
If it was approved, it must still be safe.
Reality does not respect approvals.
3. Over-Reliance on ECDIS and Alarms
Many modern accidents involve ships that were technically “inside alarms”.
Crews assumed:
- alarms would warn early
- the system would prevent danger
- deviation would be obvious
Instead, alarms triggered late, were ignored, or were misunderstood.
ECDIS does not fail by being wrong.
It fails by being trusted too much.
4. No-Go Areas That Existed Only on Paper
In many groundings, no-go areas were technically defined — but never operationalised.
Typical failures include:
- no-go areas not clearly briefed
- margins too tight to absorb error
- reliance on track adherence instead of spatial awareness
A no-go area that is never actively monitored might as well not exist.
Safety boundaries only work if they are felt, not just drawn.
5. Tight Margins Disguised as Precision
Accident routes often look clean and professional.
Straight lines. Exact waypoints. Minimal deviation.
This precision hides fragility.
Tight margins:
- reduce recovery time
- increase workload
- amplify small errors
When something deviates — and it always does — there is no room left to recover.
Neat plans fail brutally.
6. XTE and the Illusion of Protection
Investigations repeatedly show crews waiting for XTE alarms before reacting.
By the time the alarm activated:
- speed was too high
- UKC was already compromised
- helm response was insufficient
XTE did not cause the accident.
It delayed recognition.
XTE alarms indicate deviation from intention, not distance from danger.
7. UKC Misjudgement and Speed Blindness
UKC failures rarely stem from incorrect charts.
They stem from:
- underestimating squat
- failing to reduce speed
- assuming calm conditions
- treating minimum UKC as acceptable UKC
Speed quietly consumes clearance.
Many ships grounded with “enough water” on paper — until motion removed it.
8. Monitoring Collapse During Routine Periods
A common pattern is reduced vigilance during:
- night transits
- long coastal legs
- familiar waters
- “nothing happening” periods
Monitoring becomes passive.
Fixes are taken less often.
Margins are assumed intact.
Deviation becomes normalised.
Most accidents happen after the most boring part of the watch.
9. Abort Points That Were Never Used
Many investigations reveal that a safe abort was possible — earlier.
But abort points were:
- undefined
- unbriefed
- ignored under time pressure
- overridden by confidence
By the time stopping felt justified, it was already too late.
Late decisions feel reasonable.
Early decisions feel uncomfortable.
Only one of those saves ships.
10. The Human Patterns Behind Repeated Accidents
Across decades and ship types, the same human patterns recur:
- optimism replacing caution
- silence replacing challenge
- routine replacing discipline
- compliance replacing thinking
Technology changes.
Human behaviour does not.
This is why lessons must be reinforced continuously, not learned once.
11. How Professionals Break the Cycle
Professional navigators deliberately counter these patterns.
They:
- distrust neat plans
- widen margins proactively
- monitor trends, not positions alone
- call the Master early
- slow down before they need to
- treat abort points as commitments, not options
They do not ask “Can we continue?”
They ask “Should we?”
Closing Perspective
Most navigation accidents are not caused by ignorance.
They are caused by familiarity, confidence, and delayed intervention.
Passage planning works — but only when it is treated as a living process, not a completed task.
The plan does not save the ship.
The people managing it do.
Tags
passage planning failures · grounding analysis · bridge watchkeeping · navigation accidents · maritime safety